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1 Introduction
It is widely known that entrepreneurship plays an essential role in several economic
activities. When new technology is discovered, demographic change occurs or a gov-
ernment changes its policy, it is entrepreneurs who react to the changes and reallocate
resources to seek opportunities. However, there have been only a few attempts to
develop a formal model of entrepreneurship in macroeconomics. The absence of en-
trepreneurship from macroeconomics can be explained in part by the extensive use
of an exogenously given aggregate production function. As the relation between
output and inputs is given by the aggregate production function, there is no need for
an economic agent who Þnds a productive use for inputs.
This paper develops a tractable macroeconomic model that enables a theoretical
and empirical examination of a particular aspect of entrepreneurship, namely the
ability to react appropriately to unexpected changes in the environment (i.e., adapt-
ability). In this model, the aggregate production function is derived from Þrms
reactions to these changes. Therefore, we can analyze how Þrms adaptability af-
fects the macroeconomy, while retaining the advantages of the aggregate production
function.
We assume that Þrms adaptability is determined by entrepreneurs ability to
recognize changes in the environment. When an unexpected change in productivity
occurs, the marginal products of inputs deviate from input prices, and this generates
opportunities for entrepreneurs to exploit. If entrepreneurs recognize the change and
react to it, the deviation of the marginal products of the inputs from input prices
would be small. Hence, the improvement in Þrms adaptability raises allocative
efficiency, and therefore increases productivity in the economy. It is shown that
the increased adaptability of Þrms raises the total factor productivity (TFP) of the
aggregate production function in a competitive economy.
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This result does not apply if opportunities are distorted. As the social marginal
products of resources differ from the private marginal products, even if a talented en-
trepreneur can equate private marginal products to input prices, this may not improve
allocative efficiency. This intuition is analyzed formally in the context of entrepre-
neurs seeking rent. Because the results of political negotiations are uncertain, entre-
preneurs must respond to changes in the political environment. However, because
rent-seeking activities simply redistribute incomes, adapting to political changes gen-
erates negative externalities: when an entrepreneur is good at taking opportunities,
there are fewer opportunities for others. It is shown that increased Þrms adaptability
can lower TFP.
The effect of Þrms adaptability on TFP is investigated empirically. This paper
shows that the adaptability of Þrms can be estimated by the squared correlation be-
tween an unexpected shock and Þrms reactions to the shock. Using data from the
Census of Manufacturing in Japan, 19851999, we estimate Þrms adaptability and
examine the effect of adaptability on TFP by prefecture and industry. Our model
predicts that, if political shocks are negligible, full recognition of previously unpre-
dicted changes increases TFP by at least 14% in Japan. However, such recognition
lowers TFP by the same amount if all changes are due to political shocks.
A similar view of entrepreneurs is emphasized by Kirzner (1973) and Schultz
(1975). Kirzner (1973) emphasizes the essential role of entrepreneurial discovery in
market processes. Schultz (1975) deÞnes entrepreneurial ability as the ability to in-
terpret new information and allocate resources to proÞtable opportunities. Although
both researchers insist that equilibrium analysis is not suitable for understanding the
importance of entrepreneurship, we suggest that there are beneÞts of using an equi-
librium model. Hence, we represent similar aspects of entrepreneurship in a general
equilibrium model, and it is hoped that this approach complements theirs.
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This strategy has been adopted by Holmes and Schmitz (1990). Holmes and
Schmitz (1990) incorporate a Schultzian entrepreneur into an equilibrium analysis,
and emphasize the importance of the division of labor between entrepreneurs and
managers.1 This paper differs from theirs in three respects: (1) it assigns entrepre-
neurship a different social role, namely that of inßuencing allocative efficiency; (2)
it incorporates this role into the neoclassical growth model; and (3) it examines the
effect of entrepreneurship on the macroeconomy quantitatively.
This paper also contributes to a controversy in the literature on pressure groups.
Becker (1983) shows that competition between pressure groups can lead to efficient
allocation. On the other hand, Tullock (1967) argues that rent-seeking activities
waste resources. The detrimental effect of entrepreneurs rent-seeking activities has
recently been re-emphasized in the context of economic growth [e.g., by Baumol
(1990), Murphy et al. (1991) and Holmes and Schmitz (2001)]. In contrast to the
previous literature, this paper shows that, even if rent-seeking activities are costless,
competition between pressure groups may not lead to efficient allocation in the pres-
ence of political risk. Hence, the social welfare loss due to rent-seeking activities may
have been underestimated by the existing literature.
Evidence obtained in this paper is related to that obtained from plant-level data.
Much evidence from plant-level data suggests that the reallocation of resources to-
wards more productive uses is an important component of productivity growth [see
reviews by, e.g., Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) and Bartelsman and Doms (2000)].
This paper argues that the reallocation of resources might be affected by Þrms adapt-
ability.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model. Sec-
1The different roles of entrepreneurs are incorporated into equilibrium analysis by Kihlstrom and
Laffont (1979) with respect to risk bearing, by Schmitz (1989) with respect to imitation, and by
Aghion and Howitt (1992) with respect to innovation.
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tion 3 deÞnes the measure of adaptability and analyzes the macroeconomic effect of
Þrms adaptability. Section 4 extends the model to analyze the effect of political
uncertainty. Section 5 shows how the theory is implemented empirically. Section 6
reports the empirical results. Section 7 concludes by summarizing the main results
and discussing possible extensions.
2 The Model
We present a simple general equilibrium model, which is based on that of Lucas
(1978). It lays the foundations for analyzing the macroeconomic effect of entrepre-
neurship in the next section.
An agent can be an entrepreneur or a worker. Each Þrm needs one entrepreneur
to organize the Þrm. In this model, for simplicity, there is no distinction between
entrepreneurs, managers and Þrms. This simpliÞcation is made to develop a tractable
model that focuses on Þrms adaptability.
Firms are continuously distributed on [0,mN ], where m ∈ (0, 1) is the proportion
of entrepreneurs in the total population, N . Although the variables m and N can
change over time, time subscripts are omitted throughout the paper unless they are
necessary for clarity. The representative entrepreneurs problem is described Þrst,
and then the market equilibrium is deÞned.
The entrepreneurs problem: An entrepreneur establishes a Þrm, employs capi-
tal stock and workers, and produces output. The entrepreneur faces the following
production function:
Yi = ziA [F (Ki, TLi)]
α , 0 < α < 1
where zi is a Þrm-speciÞc productivity shock for the ith Þrm, and Yi, Ki and Li
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are the amounts of the ith Þrms output, capital stock and labor input, respectively.
T measures the effectiveness of labor, which is increased by general factors such as
the level of educational attainment and economy-wide technological progress. It
is assumed that F exhibits constant returns to scale in K and L. By deÞning
f (k) = F (k, 1), where k = K
TL
, we can express F (K,TL) as a function of capital
per unit of effective labor in production: F (K,TL) = f (k)TL. We assume that
f 0 (.) > 0, f 00 (.) < 0, limk→0 f (k) = 0, limk→0 f 0 (k) =∞ and limk→∞ f 0 (k) = 0.
The parameters α and A measure the span of control and the productivity of man-
agement, respectively. Because α ∈ (0, 1), the production function has decreasing
returns to scale in Ki and Li.
It is assumed that the productivity of management is a function of the effective-
ness of the entrepreneur. Because agents are homogeneous, the effectiveness of the
entrepreneur is the same as that of workers, which is given by T . Assuming that
A = T 1−α, the production function can be written as
Yi = zi [f (ki)Li]
α T.
There are three advantages to assuming that A = T 1−α. First, this assumption im-
plies that the production function has constant returns to scale in capital stock, labor
and managerial input. Hence, it can be shown that the Þrms proÞt is equivalent
to the returns to managerial input in a competitive environment [Mas-Colell et al.
(1995), p.135]. Secondly, this production function, which has constant returns to
scale, results from maximizing total output in a hierarchical organization, as Rosen
(1982) has shown. Given Rosens model, managerial input, T , is required to su-
pervise different plants. Thirdly, when T grows at a constant rate, this assumption
guarantees the existence of a balanced growth path, which is shown subsequently.
An entrepreneur has an important task other than the supervisory one. Be-
cause the movement of zi is unpredictable ex ante, when zi changes the entrepreneur
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must recognize the direction and magnitude of this change to respond appropriately.
When the entrepreneur makes production decisions, she does not observe zi, but does
observe a noisy signal, si, from which the realization of zi can be inferred. It is
assumed that the entrepreneurs inference is based on a conditional distribution func-
tion, Qh (z|s), where h measures the entrepreneurs ability to recognize changes in z.
The conditional distribution function is the same for all entrepreneurs. It implies
that all entrepreneurs share the same knowledge about the relation between the pro-
ductivity shock and the observable signal. A more detailed information structure is
speciÞed subsequently.
Note that z is assumed to be an idiosyncratic shock. Hence, the information
required to infer z must be local information. That is, entrepreneurs must process
their local information. However, as both z and s are idiosyncratic, prices in this
model do not depend on them. Hence, prices are predictable without knowing what
others observe. That is, entrepreneurs do not need to know all the local information
in an economy because the price system summarizes the information they need. This
is essentially the view of Hayek (1945). In this sense, this paper incorporates Hayeks
(1945) arguments into the neoclassical growth model, and examines the social effect
of local information.
It is assumed that the Þnancial market is complete. Therefore, entrepreneurs can
hedge against any idiosyncratic risk. Entrepreneurs maximize their Þrms expected
proÞts:
π (si) = max
k,L
½Z
zi [f (ki)Li]
α TdQh (zi|si)− wTLi − rkiTLi
¾
,
where w is the wage rate for effective labor and r is the rental price of capital. The
Þrst-order conditions are:
w = α
Z
zidQ
h (zi|si) [f (k (si))L (si)]α−1 f (k (si))− rk (si) , (1)
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r = α
Z
zidQ
h (zi|si) [f (k (si))L (si)]α−1 f 0 (k (si)) , (2)
for any s, where k (s) and L (s) are the optimal levels of k and L. Because the
production function is strictly concave in k and L and satisÞes the Inada conditions,
there exists a unique interior solution, and the Þrst-order conditions are necessary
and sufficient for the maximization problem.
Note that the two Þrst-order conditions imply that entrepreneurs equate the wage
rate (rental price) to the expected marginal product of labor (capital), not to the
actual marginal product of labor (capital). Unexpected idiosyncratic shocks cause
marginal products to deviate frommarginal costs, and these deviations provide oppor-
tunities for entrepreneurs to exploit. If entrepreneurs recognize the changes clearly,
they can take the opportunities. This is the aspect of entrepreneurship that we
emphasize in this model, and is also stressed by Kirzner (1973) and Schultz (1975).
The following is derived from the two Þrst-order conditions:
w
r
=
f (k (si))− f 0 (k (si)) k (si)
f 0 (k (si))
(3)
This equation implies that the capital stock per unit of effective labor in production
k (si) does not depend on the realization of the signal si. Hence, we denote this by
k. As the right-hand side of equation (3) is strictly increasing in k, k is uniquely
determined by w
r
.
Expected proÞts are derived by substituting the two Þrst-order conditions into
π (si): Z
π (s) dQhs (s) =
(1− α)
α
(w + rk)T
Z
L (s) dQhs (s) . (4)
Equation (4) shows that expected proÞts are proportional to the costs of production.
The arbitrage condition: Because entrepreneurs can completely hedge their risks
in the Þnancial market, they do not bear risk. As agents are identical and can be
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entrepreneurs or workers, expected proÞts must be equal to the opportunity cost of
being an entrepreneur, which is the wage rate in the labor market.Z
π (s) dQhs (s) = wT. (5)
Hence, equations (4) and (5) imply
w =
(1− α)
α
(w + rk)
Z
L (s) dQhs (s) . (6)
Resource constraints: To close the model, the labor and capital markets must
clear:
Ka = mNkT
Z
L (s) dQhs (s) , (7)
(1−m)N = mN
Z
L (s) dQhs (s) , (8)
where Ka is the aggregate capital stock. Equation (7) is the capital market clearing
condition. The left-hand side is the supply of capital and the right-hand side is the
demand for capital: mN is the number of Þrms and kT
R
L (st) dQ (st) is the average
Þrms demand for capital. Equation (8) is the labor market clearing condition. The
left-hand side is the supply of labor and the right-hand side is the demand for labor.
Market equilibrium: Market equilibrium can be formally deÞned as follows:
DeÞnition 1 A market equilibrium is {L (·) , k, w, r,m} that satisÞes the following
conditions.
1. The Þrms proÞt maximization conditions: equations (1) and ( 3).
2. The arbitrage condition: equation (6).
3. The resource constraints: equations (7) and (8).
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Let us deÞne θ (k) = f
0(k)k
f(k)
. The following theorem proves the existence and
uniqueness of the equilibrium. The proof is given in the Appendix.
Theorem 2 Suppose that limk→∞ θ (k) < 1. Then, for any ka ≡ KaTN ∈ (0,∞) , a
unique market equilibrium exists.
When many agents become entrepreneurs, few are employees. This increases
the demand for employees and reduces the supply of employees. The wage rate
is determined so that demand equals supply, which guarantees the existence of an
equilibrium. The assumption limk→∞ θ (k) < 1 is a technical one. When fewer
agents become employees, k is larger. This condition implies that as k becomes
inÞnite, the labor share does not converge to 0. That is, the wage rate must increase
at a faster rate than employment falls. This guarantees that m has a solution in
(0, 1).
The aggregate production function: Now we derive the aggregate production
function. Let Y a and ya denote aggregate output and aggregate output per unit
of effective labor in an economy, ya = Y
a
TN
, respectively. The following proposition
shows that entrepreneurs ability to recognize change can inßuence the TFP of the
aggregate production function. The proof is given in the Appendix.
Proposition 3 Suppose that limk→∞ θ (k) < 1. Then for any ka ∈ (0,∞), there
exists an aggregate production function:
ya = z (h)φ (ka) (9)
where z (h) ≡
"Z ·Z
zdQh (z|s)
¸ 1
1−α
dQhs (s)
#(1−α)
,
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φ (ka) ≡ f
µ
ka
1−m (ka)
¶α
m (ka)(1−α) [1−m (ka)]α ,
and m (ka) ∈ (0, 1) is a solution of
α
1− α
·
1− θ
µ
ka
1−m
¶¸
=
1−m
m
.
This proposition shows that h affects the TFP of the aggregate production func-
tion, but says nothing about the direction of the effect. Before examining the effect
of h on TFP, it is useful to show the properties of the aggregate production func-
tion. The following proposition shows that the derived aggregate production function
satisÞes the traditional assumptions of macroeconomics. The proof is given in the
Appendix.
Proposition 4 Suppose that limk→∞ θ (k) < 1 and limk→0 θ (k) < 1. Then the
derived aggregate production function is increasing and concave in ka ∈ (0,∞), and
satisÞes the Inada conditions:
φ0 (ka) > 0, φ00 (ka) < 0.
lim
ka→0
φ (ka) = 0, lim
ka→∞
φ0 (ka) = 0 and lim
ka→0
φ0 (ka) =∞
Both concavity and satisfaction of the Inada conditions are essential to the exis-
tence of a globally stable unique steady state in the neoclassical growth model. That
is, the derived aggregate production function satisÞes all the important assumptions
of the aggregate production function in the neoclassical growth model.
3 The Macroeconomic Effects of Adaptability
In this section, we specify the information structure that entrepreneurs can access and
examine the macroeconomic effects of entrepreneurs ability to recognize unexpected
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changes in the environment. TFP, z (h), is shown to be an increasing function of
entrepreneurial ability.
The components of z (h): Assume that log z comprises a predictable component
µ and an unpredictable component u:
log z = µ+ u
where u is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2u. It is assumed that
the unpredictable component u summarizes an unexpected change in productivity.
The entrepreneur cannot observe u before making production decisions, but she can
observe the signal s:
s = u+ ε
where ε is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2ε (h). This paper assumes
that a Þrms adaptability is determined by the entrepreneurs ability to recognize the
unexpected change. This ability can be represented by the ability to predict u
after observing s. Hence, we can apply Takiis (2003) notion of prediction ability
in this context. Let Qhu (u|s) denote the conditional distribution of u given s. The
measure of an entrepreneurs ability to recognize the unexpected change, u, is deÞned
as follows.
DeÞnition 5 The measure of an entrepreneurs ability to recognize the unexpected
change u (the measure of the Þrms adaptability) is deÞned by:
h = 1−
R
V ar (u|s) dQhs (s)
σ2u
,
where V ar (u|s) = R ¡u− R udQhu (u|s)¢2 dQhu (u|s).
This measure implies that the entrepreneur accurately recognizes u when she re-
duces on average the conditional variance having observed s. To compare ability
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in different environments,
R
V ar (u|s) dQhs (s) is divided by σ2u, which is the uncon-
ditional variance of u. The measure h ranges from 0 to 1. If the entrepreneur
perfectly recognizes the change, h = 1, whereas if the entrepreneur does not recog-
nize the change at all, h = 0.
Using the deÞnition of h, the variance of the noise term is endogenously determined
as follows:
σ2ε (h) =
(1− h)σ2u
h
. (10)
As expected, when the entrepreneur more accurately recognizes an unexpected change,
the variance of the noise term is smaller. When h = 1, the variance is 0, and when
h = 0, the variance is inÞnite.
Macroeconomic effects of entrepreneurship: Using this measure, z (h) can
be decomposed into productivity, risk and adaptability. The following theorem
summarizes one of the main results in this paper. The proof is given in the Appendix.
Theorem 6 For any ka ∈ (0,∞), a rise in h increases GDP per unit of effective
labor in an economy, ya:
ya = zeφ (ka) exp
·
ασ2uh
2 (1− α)
¸
. (11)
When an unexpected change in productivity occurs, if entrepreneurs accurately
recognize the change, the deviations of actual marginal productivities of inputs from
input prices would be small. Hence, an improvement in a Þrms adaptability raises
allocative efficiency, and therefore increases the productivity of the economy. Theo-
rem 6 shows that an increase in productivity is represented by a rise in the TFP of the
derived aggregate production function and that an increase in the Þrms adaptability
raises GDP per unit of effective labor in an economy.
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Steady state: It is easy to apply the derived aggregate production function to
the neoclassical growth model. Assume that the productivity measure, T , and the
population, N , grow at the constant rates gT and n, respectively. Assume also that
the utility function of the household is
R ((cat Tt)1−θ−1)Nt
1−θ e
−ρtdt, where cat is consumption
per unit of effective labor in an economy. The steady-state values of cat and k
a
t in
the neoclassical growth model must satisfy the following:
z (h)φ0 (ka) = δ + ρ+ θgT ,
ca = z (h)φ (ka)− (n+ δ + gT ) ka,
where z (h) = ze exp ασ
2
uh
2(1−α) and δ is the depreciation rate of the capital stock. These
two equations yield the steady-state values of ca and ka. In the steady state, con-
sumption per capita, GDP per capita and capital stock per capita grow at the constant
rate gT . Hence, an increase in h raises the level of ka and ca, but does not change
the growth rate.
The lack of a growth effect may be perceived as a weakness of the model, as
entrepreneurs are thought to develop new products and affect economic growth. Of
course, if innovation were formally modeled, it would be possible to construct a model
in which entrepreneurial ability affects the long-run growth rate. However, this paper
separates adaptability from innovative ability. If only adaptability is considered, it
is conceivable that entrepreneurial ability does not affect the long-run growth rate,
although it would affect temporal changes in the growth rate.
4 Political Risk and Entrepreneurship
In the previous section, it was argued that entrepreneurship can improve allocative ef-
Þciency and the TFP of an economy, because when entrepreneurs recognize a change
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correctly, they can equate the marginal products of inputs to their prices. How-
ever, in this section, we use an example to show that if opportunities are distorted,
adaptability can lower the TFP of an economy.
Assume that subsidies increase Þrm-speciÞc productivity and that all subsidies
are Þnanced by income tax:
zi = (1− τ ) (1 +Gi)
where τ is the constant average and marginal income tax rate andGi is the subsidy for
the ith Þrm. It is assumed that in the absence of taxes and subsidies, the productivity
of each Þrm is unity. The subsidies have two components: a predictable component
g (Ri) and an unpredictable component ui.
log (1 +Gi) = g (Ri) + ui
where Ri is the rent-seeking activity of the ith Þrm and ui is normally distributed
with mean 0 and variance σ2u. The random variable ui can be interpreted as a
political shock. Because political outcomes depend on the opinions, political tactics
and negotiations of politicians, the results are difficult to predict. The random factor,
ui, represents this uncertainty. It is assumed that Ri is chosen before entrepreneurs
observe signals. Then, because entrepreneurs are identical, all choose the same level
of rent-seeking activity, Ri = R and g (Ri) = g (R). If we set µ = log (1− τ)+g (R),
the analysis of the previous section is applicable in this context.
As rent-seeking activities do not change aggregate income, µ must be chosen
endogenously to satisfy the following resource constraint:
0 =
Z
(1− zi) [f (k)L (si)]α TdQhzs (zi, si)m (12)
where L (s), k and m are the market equilibrium solutions to the previous problem.
Note that
R
[f (k)L (si)]
α TdQhzs (zi, si)m and
R
zi [f (k)L (si)]
α TdQhzs (zi, si)m are
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the values of aggregate output before and after the transfer of income, respectively.
Hence, equation (12) requires that the income transfer does not change aggregate
output.
Note that L (s) is chosen when entrepreneurs expect an income transfer. Hence,
the value of aggregate output before the income transfer takes place is affected by
entrepreneurs predictions of the realization of the political shock. The following
theorem shows that an increase in Þrms adaptability lowers TFP when there is
political risk. The proof is given in the Appendix.
Theorem 7 Suppose that µ satisÞes equation (12 ). Then, for any ka ∈ (0,∞), a
rise in h reduces GDP per unit of effective labor in an economy, ya:
ya = φ (ka) exp
· −ασ2uh
2 (1− α)
¸
. (13)
Political risk reduces TFP because political risk generates a negative externality:
when an entrepreneur is good at taking opportunities, there are fewer opportunities
for others. In fact, it is shown that when equation (12) is satisÞed, µ is chosen to
satisfy
µ =
−ασ2uh
(1− α) −
σ2u
2
.
Although individual entrepreneurs react to the political shock given µ, since these
reactions do not produce new value in the economy, adaptability lowers µ to satisfy
equation (12). This generates a negative externality.
Two comments are warranted. First, equation (13) shows that, if there is no
political risk, competition between pressure groups leads to efficient allocation, as
suggested by Becker (1983). More importantly, equation (13) shows that if there is
political risk, even if rent-seeking activities are costless, political uncertainty can con-
fuse entrepreneurs and thereby lower productivity. That is, entrepreneurship might
have a detrimental effect on the economy in the presence of political risk. Hence,
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the social welfare loss due to rent-seeking activities may have been underestimated
by the existing literature.
5 A Framework for an Empirical Study
The objective is to investigate the effect of Þrms adaptability on TFP. The growth
rate of TFP, gTFP , is usually deÞned as gTFP ≡ g Y
N
− φ0(ka)ka
φ(ka)
gK
N
, where g Y
N
and gK
N
are the growth rates of GDP per capita and capital stock per capita, respectively.
Theorem 6 implies that
gTFP ≈ gze +
µ
1− φ
0 (ka) ka
φ (ka)
¶
gT +
α
2 (1− α)
£
hdσ2u + σ
2
udh
¤
. (14)
To test the implication of equation (14), the following empirical equation is ex-
amined:
∆ logTFP = ψ0 + ψz∆ log z
e + ψT∆ log T + ψσht∆σ
2
u + ψhσ
2
ut−1∆h+ ε, (15)
where ψ0, ψT , ψσ and φh are constant parameters. The growth rate of T , ∆ logT ,
represents aggregate productivity growth. The growth rate of ze, ∆ log ze, can be
interpreted as Þrm-speciÞc productivity growth. After controlling for these two
effects, our theory predicts that a change in both risk and adaptability has a positive
effect on the growth rate of TFP. Note that even if political risk is important, once
we control for ze, adaptability should have a positive effect on TFP.
The estimation of this equation requires estimates of the variables, ∆ logTFP ,
∆ log ze, ∆ log T , σ2u and h, which are described below.
Data description: Proxies for Y , K, wTL, wT and r were constructed mainly from
the Census of Manufacturing in Japan for 19851999, which was provided by I-N
Information Systems, LTD. The census covers all establishments in which four or
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more persons work as employers or employees, and the data are aggregated by city
and industry for each year. This enables panel data analysis of the behavior of the
typical establishment by city and industry. Details of the data and the construction
of variables are given in the Appendix.
The data are split into two periods: 19851991 and 19921999. These periods
roughly correspond to before and after the bursting of the bubble in Japan. We
estimate, σ2u and h using the constructed Y , wTL, wT , r and K, by prefecture,
industry and period. Then, ∆ log TFP , ∆ log ze, ∆ log T , ∆σ2u and ∆h are estimated
by prefecture and industry. We treated 1988 and 1996 as representative years for
each period. That is, we estimated the aggregate production functions TFP growth
by prefecture and industry between 1988 and 1996. These estimated variables are
used in our regression analyses. The estimation method is explained below.
Estimation of ∆ log TFP , ∆ log ze and ∆ logT : First, we derive the equations
that relate ∆ log TFP , ∆ log ze and ∆ logT to observable variables, and then provide
an interpretation of each equation. Details of the estimation method are given in
the Appendix.
The following proposition explains the estimation of∆ log TFP ,∆ log zeand∆ log T .
The proof is given in the Appendix.
Proposition 8 If w is constant, the growth rate of TFP, ∆ log TFP , aggregate pro-
ductivity growth, ∆ log T , and Þrm-speciÞc productivity growth, ∆ log ze, can be esti-
mated as follows:
∆ log TFP = ∆ log
Y
N
− φ
0 (ka) ka
φ (ka)
∆ log
K
N
(16)
∆ log T = ∆ logwT, (17)
∆ log ze = ∆ log
Z ·
Y (z, s)
(wTL (s))αwT (1−α)
¸
Qhzs (z, s)− αθ (k)∆ log
K
wTL
,(18)
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where φ
0(ka)ka
φ(ka)
, αθ (k) and α are estimated by
φ0 (ka) ka
φ (ka)
= αθ (k) =
1R hY (z,s)
rK(s)
i
dQhzs (z, s)
, (19)
α =
1R h Y (z,s)
rK(s)+wTL(s)
i
dQhzs (z, s)
, (20)
Y (z, s) ≡ z [f (k)L (s)]α T, K (s) ≡ kTL (s) .
Equation (16) is the usual deÞnition of TFP growth, except that the method
of estimating the elasticity of output with respect to capital is unusual. Equation
(19) shows that this can be estimated by the average capital share. Note that the
deÞnition of the average capital share corresponds to the usual one when there is no
random component.
Equation (17) shows that aggregate productivity growth can be estimated by
the growth rate of the average wage. When productivity growth is economy-wide,
competition in the labor market pushes up workers wage rates. Equation (17)
reßects this intuition.
To interpret equation (18), we consider the case in which z is predictable. If z is
predictable, equation (18) can be re-written as:
∆ log z = ∆ log Y − α [1− θ (k)]∆ logL− αθ (k)∆ logK − [1− αθ (k)]∆ logwT.
This equation shows that ∆ log z represents the growth rate of value added that
cannot be explained by the growth rate of labor input, capital input or wage rates.
Hence, this is TFP growth excluding the contribution represented by the growth
rate of wage rates. That is, the estimated ∆ log z excludes aggregate shocks in
productivity changes. An aggregate shock raises wage rates and causes the effect
to deviate from the components of ∆ log z. Firm-speciÞc productivity growth is the
component of ∆ log z.
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It may be objected that a constant w is not consistent with our theory, as shifts
in ze, h and σ2u change w. However, as we are using regional data, workers can move
between regions. Hence, if the labor market is competitive, w is approximately the
same in all regions and industries. To the extent that ze, h and σ2u do not change
on average, a constant w is justiÞed. In fact, the data support this assumption, as
is shown subsequently. Hence, this assumption is innocuous.
Estimation of h and σ2u: Next, we explain the estimation of h and σ
2
u. It is shown
subsequently that h can be estimated by the correlation between the unexpected
shock and the reaction to the shock. If a Þrms response to the shock is appropriate,
this correlation must be high. To conÞrm this intuition, we must deÞne the reaction
to the shock.
DeÞnition 9 The Þrms reaction to the shock R (L (s)), is deÞned as the logarithm
of the deviation of actual labor input, L (s), from predicted labor input, L∗:
R (L (s)) = logL (s)− logL∗,
where L∗ is estimated from the input level in the absence of an unexpected shock:
L∗ =
½
ze
w
α [f (ka)− f 0 (ka) ka]
¾ 1
1−α
f (ka) . (21)
Equation (21) is derived by substituting ze into the Þrst-order conditions (1) and
(2) for
R
zidQ
h (zi|si). Using the deÞnition of the Þrms reaction to the shock, the
following theorem is proved in the Appendix.
Theorem 10 The entrepreneurs adaptability, h, can be estimated by the correlation
between u and R (L (s)):
h =
£
ρuR(L(s))
¤2
, ρuR(L(s)) > 0,
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where
ρuR(L(s)) =
R
u
¡
R (L (s))− R R (L (s)) dQhs (s)¢ dQhus (u, s)qR
u2dQu (u)
R ¡
R (L (s))− R R (L (s)) dQhs (s)¢2 dQhs (s) .
Theorem 10 shows that h can be estimated by the squared correlation between
the unexpected shock and the Þrms reaction to the shock. The proof is based on
the Þrst-order condition (1). The entrepreneur employs more than the predicted
level of labor input when she believes that a positive productivity shock has been
realized, and employs less than the predicted level when she believes that a negative
one has occurred. When the entrepreneurs belief is accurate, the correlation must
be larger.
To implement this idea, we need to estimate L∗. This involves the estimation of an
unknown function f (·). However, if the economy is in the steady state, the correlation
between the unexpected shock and the reaction to the shock can be estimated without
using the function f (·). In the steady state, k and w are constant. Because the
correlation coefficient is invariant to an affine transformation of a variable ( ρXY =
ρX(ηY+ι), where η and ι are constant ), the following corollary can be easily proven
from the deÞnition of u and R (L (s)).
Corollary 11 In the steady state, the correlation between the unexpected shock and
the reaction to the shock can be estimated by the correlation between log Y−α logwTL−
(1− α) logwT and logwTL− α logwTL− (1− α) logwT .
Corollary 11 shows that the main factor affecting h is the correlation between
value added and labor expenses. Obviously, this is a fairly crude measure of adapt-
ability. If we could explicitly model the information that entrepreneurs observe, a
more accurate measure might be obtained. However, observable data are less likely
to reßect the ideas of Hayek (1945) and Kirzner (1973), who emphasize the impor-
tance of unobservable local information. Moreover, Davis and Haltiwanger (1999)
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insist that unobserved idiosyncratic factors play a dominant role in explaining the
redistribution of workers. Genda (1998) conÞrms this for Japan.
The correlation measure reßects the value of local information. To understand
this, it is helpful to modify the equations in corollary 11.
log Y − α logwTL− (1− α) logwT = log Y − α logL− logwT, (22)
logwTL− α logwTL− (1− α) logwT = (1− α) logL. (23)
Equation (22) measures Þrm-speciÞc productivity, since an aggregate productivity
shock must also increase wT . The two equations show that h can be measured by the
correlation between a Þrm-speciÞc shock and labor input.2 Hence, we suggest that,
despite its potential problems, the correlation measure contains useful information
about the ability of Þrms to process local information.
The correlation measure can be affected by various factors, including talent levels
in management groups, education, personal networks, population density, regional
transportation costs, and communication costs within organizations. In the absence
of a theory of what determines adaptability, identifying the factors that enhance
entrepreneurship is beyond the scope of this paper. However, we doubt that the
correlation measure would be greatly affected by factors affecting adjustment costs,
as adjustment costs lower not only the covariance of value added and labor expenses,
but also their variances.
Corollary 11 uses labor expenses as a proxy for labor input for the estimation of h.
There are two justiÞcations for this proxy. First, the data set used for the empirical
study does not include data on the number of employees, but does include data on
the sum of employees and employers. Hence, labor expenses are the best available
measure of labor input. Second, many unobserved inputs cannot be represented by
2In fact, we can show that the correlation between the unexpected shock and the reaction to the
shock is equivalent to the correlation between log z and logL in the steady state.
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the number of employees. Because it is difficult to Þre employees, Þrms are likely
to react to unexpected changes by varying working hours or workers effort levels.
Expenses best reßect these unobserved inputs.
If the economy is in the steady state, σ2u can be estimated as follows:
σ2u = V ar [log Y (z, s)− α logwTL (s)− (1− α) logwT ] ,
where V ar (x) is the variance of x. As discussed above, equation (22) implies that
σ2u can be interpreted as a measure of changes in Þrm-speciÞc productivity.
Strictly speaking, the steady-state assumption is not consistent with regression
equation (2), because if the economy is in the steady state, gTFP ≈
³
1− φ0(ka)ka
φ(ka)
´
gT .
The economy is assumed to be in the steady state between 1985 and 1991, and
between 1992 and 1999. A large shock is assumed to occur around 1991, which
caused the economy to move from one steady state to the other. The values of h and
σ2u during the transition period are approximated by the steady-state values of h and
σ2u. Because the Japanese bubble burst in 1991, it is not unreasonable to assume
that the steady state changed around this time.
Alternative method of estimation: If the steady-state assumption is restrictive,
an alternative method of estimating h is to specify the production function. Assume
that f (k) = Bkβ. Then the following corollary can be proven in the same way as
corollary 11 was proven.
Corollary 12 Suppose that f (k) = Bkβ and w are constant. Then, the unexpected
shock and the reaction to the shock can be estimated by the correlation between log Y −
α (1− β) logwTL − αβ logK − (1− α) logwT and logwTL − α (1− β) logwTL −
αβ logK − (1− α) logwT . Moreover, the measure of risk, σ2u, can be estimated by
the variance of log Y −α (1− β) logwTL−αβ logK−(1− α) logwT , where α (1− β)
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and αβ can be estimated respectively by
α (1− β) = 1R h Y (z,s)
wTL(s)
i
dQhzs (z, s)
,
αβ =
1R hY (z,s)
rK(s)
i
dQhzs (z, s)
.
When f (k) = Bkβ and w are constant, the estimation of ∆ log ze is modiÞed as
follows:
∆ log ze = ∆ log
Z
Y (z, s)
[wTL (s)]α(1−β)K (s)αβ wT (1−α)
dQhzs (z, s) .
The robustness of the results that follow can be checked by using the two alternative
measures.
6 Empirical Results
This section reports the empirical results. First, summary statistics are reported.
Then the regression results are reported.
Summary statistics: Table 1 reports the summary statistics of our estimates. The
annual TFP growth rate is about 2 and aggregate productivity growth is 1.7%. This
means that aggregate productivity growth accounts for most of the growth in TFP,
which is broadly consistent with the steady-state assumption.
On average, Þrm-speciÞc productivity declined slightly (-0.39% ∼ -0.45%), and
the level of idiosyncratic risk remained constant. Note that we split the sample
at approximately the point when Japans bubble burst. Barseghyan (2003) and
Nishimura et al (2003) argue that many unproductive Þrms survived in Japan during
the 1990s. The fall in average Þrm-speciÞc productivity might reßect the survival of
weak Þrms in economy.
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Variable Obs. Mean (1988-1996) Std. Dev. Mean (annual)
∆ log TFP 800 0.156∗ 0.301 1.95
∆ log ze
¡
f (k) = Bkβ
¢
800 -0.031∗ 0.376 -0.39
∆ log ze (steady) 800 -0.036∗ 0.380 -0.45
∆ logT 800 0.139∗ 0.088 1.74
∆ρuR(L(s))
¡
f (k) = Bkβ
¢
800 0.053∗ 0.322 0.66
∆ρuR(L(s)) (steady) 800 0.024
∗ 0.315 0.30
∆h
¡
f (k) = Bkβ
¢
587 0.028∗ 0.152 0.35
∆h (steady) 592 0.023∗ 0.153 0.29
∆σ2u
¡
f (k) = Bkβ
¢
800 -0.003 0.070 -0.04
∆σ2u (steady) 800 -0.003 0.070 -0.04
Table 1: Summary statistics (19881995)
steady means that the steady state is assumed and f (k) = Bkβ means that
f (k) is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas for the purposes of estimation. ∗ indicates
signiÞcance at the 5% level.
The average of the measure of Þrms adaptability increased modestly (0.29% ∼
0.35%). The modest increase in adaptability is conÞrmed by the simple correlation
between an unexpected shock and Þrms reactions to the shock (0.3% ∼ 0.66%).
The increase in the adaptability measure during the 1990s is interesting. Although
adjustment is expected to be more difficult during a recession, the data show that, on
average, Japanese Þrms improved their adaptability. This suggests that the measure
of adaptability is not greatly affected by recession. As already discussed, the use
of the correlation measure broadly corresponds to excluding the effect of adjustment
costs. The data lend some support to this argument.
Small and opposing changes in Þrm-speciÞc productivity and adaptability and
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no movement in risk imply that w would not be greatly affected by changes in these
variables. This provides empirical justiÞcation for our assumption that w is constant.
Moreover, opposing changes in Þrm-speciÞc productivity and adaptability are also
consistent with our theory: an increase in adaptability lowers ze in the presence of
political risk. Because the governments share of output increased during the 1990s
in Japan [e.g., Hayashi and Prescott (2002)], our theory suggests that Þrms might
have responded more to political shocks during the 1990s.
Note here that there are fewer observations on∆h than on∆ρuR(L(s)). To estimate
∆h, we require a positive correlation in both periods. Twenty-six percent of our
observations do not satisfy this condition. To check the robustness of our results, we
also investigate regression analysis with the simple correlation below.
Regression results: Table 2 reports our regression results. All regressions show
that a change in Þrms adaptability increases TFP. This is consistent with the pre-
diction of our theory: adaptability increases TFP once ze has been controlled for.
This result is robust. It passes several robustness checks.3
However, our theory is not consistent with risk having a negative effect on TFP
growth: our theory predicts a positive effect. This suggests that other factors should
be incorporated into our model. For example, if risk cannot be hedged in a Þnan-
cial market, then the behavior of risk-averse entrepreneurs may explain the perverse
Þnding. Irreversible investment constitutes another possible explanation. These
possibilities suggest further research.
3We included employment or the number of establishments to control for scale effects. We also
added the growth rate of employment to check whether the high correlation picks up the effect of
growing Þrms. Including these variables does not change our results. We also used weighted least
squares estimation using the square root of the number of cities as weights. This did not change
our results either.
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∆ log TFP = ψ0 + ψz∆ log z
e + ψT∆ log T + ψσht∆σ
2
u + ψhσ
2
ut−1∆h+ ε
f (k) = Bkβ f (k) = Bkβ steady steady
∆ log T 0.752∗∗∗ 0.882∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 0.902∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.104) (0.083) (0.099)
∆ log ze 0.522∗∗∗ 0.547∗∗∗ 0.510∗∗∗ 0.546∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.023) (0.019) (0.022)
ρuR(L(s))t∆σ
2
u -0.593
∗ -0.787∗∗∗
(0.298) (0.272)
σ2ut−1∆ρuR(L(s)) 0.781
∗∗ 1.139∗∗∗
(0.294) (0.289)
ht∆σ
2
u -1.199
∗ -1.877∗∗∗
(0.607) (0.479)
σ2ut−1∆h 2.415
∗∗∗ 4.136∗∗∗
(0.587) (0.836)
constant 0.068∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016)
Adj R-squared 0.526 0.550 0.539 0.571
Obs. 800 587 800 592
Table 2: The effect of Þrms adaptability on TFP
steady means that the steady state is assumed and f (k) = Bkβ means that
f (k) is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas for the purposes of estimation. ∗ indicates
signiÞcance at the 5% level. ∗∗ indicates signiÞcance at the 1% level. ∗∗∗ indicates
signiÞcance at the 0.5% level. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Despite this inconsistency, the signiÞcantly positive effect of adaptability is inter-
esting. Suppose the coefficient for adaptability is 4.1 for example. Since average risk
is 0.035, a coefficient of 4.1 implies that if a Þrm fully recognizes previously unpre-
dicted changes in its environment, TFP increases by 14%, having controlled for the
negative externality. This means that if political risk is negligible, full recognition of
previously unpredicted changes raises TFP by 14%. An obvious problem is that we
cannot distinguish political shocks from others. However, another extreme example
is informative. Suppose that political shocks are the only source of risk. When a
Þrm fully recognizes previously unpredicted political shocks, equation (13) predicts
that TFP falls by 14%.
Of course, this is a rough estimate. Although we implicitly assume that aggre-
gation eliminates measurement errors, this assumption might be questionable. How-
ever, measurement error typically causes effects to be underestimated. Hence, our
estimates probably understate the real effect. Similarly, if h is heterogeneous in
an industry and a prefecture, the estimated relation between aggregate productivity
and the average value of h would understate the real relation. Again, our estimates
would understate the real relation. Hence, the estimate obtained in this paper is
conservative. A more accurate estimate requires more disaggregated data.
7 Conclusions and Extensions
This paper has presented a tractable macroeconomic model that enables a theoretical
and empirical investigation of a particular aspect of entrepreneurshipreacting ap-
propriately to unexpected changes in the environment. We have shown that greater
adaptability raises total factor productivity (TFP) in a competitive economy. How-
ever, greater adaptability may lower TFP if opportunities are distorted.
Several extensions are being considered. First, although it has been assumed for
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simplicity that all shocks are idiosyncratic and not persistent, this assumption leads
us to underestimate the importance of entrepreneurship. An election or a revolution
represents an aggregate political shock. The introduction of new technology probably
generates persistent shocks. Incorporating these shocks into the model would be an
interesting extension.
Second, the source of shocks must be empirically identiÞed. Although we Þnd
empirical evidence of a positive direct effect of entrepreneurship on TFP, the overall
effect is ambiguous. Identifying the source of shocks would enable estimation of the
overall effect of entrepreneurship on TFP.
Third, investigating factors that enhance entrepreneurship would be interesting.
Although average adaptability is estimated by industry and prefecture in this paper,
we have said nothing about why adaptability differs between industries and prefec-
tures. Adaptability may be affected by various factors, including inherited ability,
education, social networks, connections, the density of a region, regional communica-
tion systems, and organizations. Since we have a well-deÞned measure of adaptability,
it may be possible to identify empirically the factors that inßuence entrepreneurship.
Finally, it would be interesting to examine the extent to which a distorted reward
structure for entrepreneurs might reduce TFP. Macroeconomists have recently found
that differences in unexplained exogenous productivity in the aggregate production
function explain a high proportion of income differences between countries [e.g., Hall
and Jones (1999) and Prescott (1998)]. Hayashi and Prescott (2002) argue that
part of the lost decade in Japan can be explained by the slowdown in TFP growth.
Because the model in this paper relates entrepreneurs rent-seeking activities to TFP,
it may provide a suitable empirical framework within which to examine the extent to
which rent-seeking activities explain these problems.
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8 Appendix
Mathematical Appendix:
Proof of Theorem 2: From the two resource constraints, (7) and (8), k can be
expressed as a function of the aggregate capital stock per unit of effective labor in an
economy:
k =
ka
1−m, (24)
where ka = K
a
TN
. From equations (3), (6) and (8), we derive that
1−m
m
=
α
1− α [1− θ (k)] , (25)
where θ (k) ≡ f 0(k)k
f(k)
∈ (0, 1). DeÞne a function G (m, k):
G (m, ka) ≡ α
1− α
·
1− θ
µ
ka
1−m
¶¸
− 1−m
m
(26)
We must show that for any ka ∈ (0,∞), there exists an m ∈ (0, 1) that satisÞes
G (m, ka) = 0. (27)
It can be shown that limm→0G (m, ka) < 0 since when m converges to 0, the second
term of equation (26) goes to ∞ and the Þrst term is Þnite. When m converges
to 1, the second term of equation (26) goes to 0 and the Þrst term is positive, since
limk→∞ θ (k) < 1 by assumption. This proves that there exists an m∗ ∈ (0, 1) that
satisÞes equation (27). Moreover, the solution m∗ is unique, since it can be shown
that
G1 (m,k
a) |G(m,ka)=0
=
1
m (1−m)
·
1−m
m
− αm
1− αθ
0 (k) k
¸
=
1
m (1−m)
α
1− α [1− θ (k)−mθ
0 (k) k]
=
1
m (1−m)
α
1− α
½
[1− θ (k)] [1−mθ (k)]−mf
00 (k) k
f 0 (k)
θ (k)
¾
> 0. (28)
30
The derivation of the second equation uses G (m, ka) = 0 and the derivation of the
third equation uses the deÞnition of θ (k). Given m, equation (24) uniquely solves for
k, and, given a unique k, equation (3) uniquely solves for w
r
. Equations (1), (7) and
(8) imply that
1−m
m
=
Z ·Z
zdQh (z|s)
¸ 1
1−α
dQhs (s)
·
αf (k)α
w + rk
¸ 1
1−α
, (29)
Given unique values of w
r
and k, this equation uniquely solves for r and, therefore,
also uniquely solves for w. Finally, given unique values of w, r and k, equation (1)
uniquely solves for L (s). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: Aggregate output per unit of effective labor in an economy,
ya, can be expressed as follows:
ya =
mNyT
R
L (s) dQhs (s)
TN
, (30)
where y =
R Y (zs)
TL(s)
dQhzs (z, s). Since it can be shown that y =
w+rk
α
, substituting this
equation and equation (8) into equation (30) yields
ya =
w + rk
α
(1−m) . (31)
Rearranging equation (29) yields
w + rk
α
=
"Z ·Z
zdQh (z|s)
¸ 1
1−α
dQhs (s)
#(1−α)
f
µ
k
(1−m)
¶αµ
m
1−m
¶(1−α)
.
Applying this equation to equation (31) yields the desired result. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: The deÞnition of φ (ka) implies that
φ0 (ka) = αf (k)α−1
µ
m
1−m
¶(1−α)
f 0 (k)D, (32)
where D ≡
·
1 + k
dm
dka
¸
+
f (k)
f 0 (k)
·
(1− α) (1−m)
αm
− 1
¸
dm
dka
.
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Equation (27) implies D = 1. Hence φ0 (ka) > 0.
To examine the second derivative, note that the Þrst derivative can be rewritten
as
φ0 (ka) = α
θ (k)φ (ka)
ka
. (33)
Hence the second derivative can be written as
φ00 (ka) = M
φ0 (ka)
θ (k) ka
where M = θ0 (k)
dk
dka
ka − θ (k) [1− αθ (k)]
Hence, the sign of φ00 (ka) is the same as that of M . To determine the sign of M ,
two lemmas are required.
Lemma 13 The sign of m0 (ka) is determined by the sign of θ0 (k):
m0 (ka) =
θ0 (k)m
1− θ (k)− θ0 (k) km.
Proof. Equation (27) implies that
m0 (ka) =
α
1−αθ
0 (k)
1
m
¡
1−m
m
¢− α
1−αθ
0 (k) k
,
=
θ0 (k)m
1− θ (k)− θ0 (k) km.
The derivation of the second equation uses the fact that α
1−α
£
1− θ ¡ ka
1−m
¢¤
= 1−m
m
.
Equation (28) shows that 1− θ (k)− θ0 (k) km is positive.
Lemma 14 A rise in ka increases k:
dk
dka
=
1− θ (k)
(1−m) (1− θ (k)− θ0 (k) km) > 0
Proof. Equation (24) implies that
dk
dka
=
1 + km0 (ka)
1−m .
The desired result follows from Lemma 13.
32
Applying Lemma 14 to the deÞnition of M , the following equation is derived:
M =
θ0 (k) [1− θ (k)] k − θ (k) [1− αθ (k)] (1− θ (k)− θ0 (k) km)
1− θ (k)− θ0 (k) km .
Since θ (k) = f
0(k)k
f(k)
, the numerator becomes:
θ0 (k) [1− θ (k)] k − θ (k) [1− αθ (k)] (1− θ (k)− θ0 (k) km)
= θ (k)2 [1− θ (k)] [α +m− 1− αmθ (k)]
+θ (k)
f 00 (k) k
f 0 (k)
[1− θ (k) + (1− αθ (k))mθ (k)]
Equation (27) implies that α +m− 1− αmθ (k) = 0. Hence M < 0, and therefore,
φ00 (ka) < 0.
Equation (27) also implies that limk→0 θ (k) < 1 guarantees that limka→0m (ka) ∈
(0, 1). Hence, limka→0 φ (ka) = 0 since limk→0 f (k) = 0, and limk→0 φ0 (k) =∞ since
equation (32) implies that limk→0 f (k) = 0 and limk→0 f 0 (k) = ∞ guarantee this.
Equation (27) also implies that limk→∞ θ (k) < 1 guarantees that limka→∞m (ka) ∈
(0, 1). Hence, equation (32) proves limk→∞ φ0 (k) = 0 since limk→∞ f 0 (k) = 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 6: Applying the standard Bayesian updating technique, it can
be shown that Z
udQhu (u|s) = hs,
V ar (u|s) = (1− h) σ2u.
Using these results,
R
zdF (z|s) can be expressed as follows:Z
zdQh (z|s) = ze exp
·
hs− σ
2
uh
2
¸
, (34)
where ze = exp
³
µ+ σ
2
u
2
´
. Since the variance of s is σ2u + σ
2
ε, this can be written as
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σ2u
h
. Using this result, it is easy to show that"Z ·Z
zdQh (z|s)
¸ 1
1−α
dQhs (s)
#(1−α)
= ze exp
ασ2uh
2 (1− α) .
Hence, the desired result follows. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 7: To prove the theorem, the following lemma is needed.
Lemma 15 Equation (12) is equivalent toZ ·Z
zidQ
h (zi|si)
¸ α
1−α
dQhs (s) =
Z ·Z
zidQ
h (z|s)
¸ 1
1−α
dQhs (s)
Proof. Since L (s) satisÞes equation (1),Z
(1− zi) [f (k)L (s)]α TdQhzs (z, s)m
=
Z
(1− zi)
·Z
zidQ
h (zi|si)
¸ α
1−α
dQhzs (z, s)
·
αf (k)
w + rk
¸ α
1−α
Tm
Hence, equation (12) implies
0 =
Z
(1− zi)
·Z
zidQ
h (zi|si)
¸ α
1−α
dQhzs (z, s) .
The desired result follows.
Since log z = µ+ u, equation (34) implies thatZ µZ
zidQ
h (zi|si)
¶ 1
1−α
dQhs (si) = (z
e)
1
1−α exp
ασ2uh
(1− α)2 ,
and Z µZ
zidQ
h (zi|si)
¶ α
1−α
dQhs (si) = (z
e)
α
1−α exp
α (2α− 1)σ2uh
2 (1− α)2 ,
where ze = exp
³
µ+ σ
2
u
2
´
. Using lemma 15, ze can be solved for as a function of h
and σ2u:
ze = exp
−ασ2uh
(1− α) .
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The desired result follows from theorem 6. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8: The derivation of equation (17) is straightforward. Equa-
tion (18) is derived from the deÞnition of the Þrms production function. We utilize
the fact that random variables do not affect k. Equation (20) is derived from the
two Þrst-order conditions (1) and (2). We now explain the derivation of equation
(19). Equation (33) implies that
φ0 (ka) ka
φ (ka)
= αθ (k) .
In addition, the Þrst-order condition (2) implies that
αθ (k) =
1R z[f(k)L(s)]αT
rkTL(s)
dQz (z)
.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 10: Applying equation (34) to equation (21), it can be shown
that L∗ =
©
ze
w
α [f (ka)− f 0 (ka) ka]ª 11−α f (ka)
L (s) = L∗ exp
µ
hs− σ
2
uh
2
¶ 1
1−α
.
Hence, the Þrms reaction to the shock R (L (s)) is given by 1
(1−α)
h
hs− σ2uh
2
i
. Hence,
the deÞnition of the correlation coefficient implies that
ρuR(L(s)) =
√
h.
Q.E.D.
Data Appendix:
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Data description: Every year the Japanese Ministry of the Economy, Trade and In-
dustry releases the Census of Manufacturing by city and industry. However, because
of minor changes in the classiÞcation of industries and the integration and division
of cities, the data that are released must be modiÞed for use in panel data analysis.
I-N Information Systems, Ltd undertakes this modiÞcation and thereby enables panel
data analysis of the behavior of the average establishment by city and industry.
Although the census covers all establishments in which four or more persons work
as employers or employees, if there are fewer than three establishments for an industry
in a city in any given year, data are not reported by the census, to maintain the privacy
of establishments. To improve estimation of the correlation, we exclude entities on
which there are missing variables in any period.
The industries covered by the census are Food, Drink/tobacco/feed, Textiles,
Apparels, Lumber/wood products, Furniture/Þxtures, Pulp/paper, Printing, Chem-
icals, Petroleum/coal products, Plastic products, Rubber, Leather/leather products,
Pottery/glass products, Iron/steel, Non-ferrous metals, Metal products, General ma-
chinery, Electrical machinery, Transportation machinery, Precision tools, Weapons
and Other industries.
Y and wTL : Gross value added and labor expenses are divided by the number of
establishments. These values are then deßated by the GDP price deßator.
K : Fixed tangible assets are divided by the number of establishments. The replace-
ment cost of the capital stock is then estimated from the following equation:
Kit+1 = Kit + (Fit+1 − Fit) /pIt+1, if Fit+1 > Fit,
= Kit + Fit+1 − Fit, if Fit+1 ≤ Fit,
where Ki1 = Fi1/pI1 and Fit is average Þxed tangible assets per establishment and
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pIt is a price deßator for investment goods, which is taken from Keizai Tokei Nenkan
(2002) (Annual Economic Statistics 2002) by Toyo Keizai Shinpo Sya. As we do not
have data on investment, this simpliÞed estimation method is used as an approxima-
tion, which is the approach taken by Nishimura, Nakajima and Kiyota (2003).
The Census of Manufacturing only reports Þxed tangible assets for establishments
in which the number of employers or employees is at least 10 [size group 2]. Hence,
the capital stock of establishments with between four and nine employees or employers
[size group 1] is estimated as follows. First, average labor expenses per establishment
of size groups 1 and 2 are estimated by city, industry and year. Average Þxed assets
per establishment are then regressed on average labor expenses per establishments
in size group 2 for each industry. A Þxed-effects regression is used for this purpose.
The parameters of this regression are used to estimate the capital stock in size group
1.
To estimate average labor expenses per establishment in size groups 1 and 2, the
following estimation method is used. The Census of Manufacturing reports labor
expenses and the number of establishments for size groups 1 and 2 by industry and
year. Using these data, average labor expenses per establishment are estimated by
size group, industry and year. Assuming that the ratio of average labor expenses per
establishment in size group 1 to those in size group 2 is the same for each industry
and year, average labor expenses per establishment are estimated by city, industry
and year.
wT : wT is estimated by prefecture, industry and year by the weighted average of
deßated labor expenses over the number of employees. The number of establishments
is the weight. Because the number of employees is not reported, it is estimated. The
Census of Manufacturing reports the number of employees, the sum of employees and
employers, and the number of establishments by industry and year. Assuming that
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the ratio of employees per establishment to the sum of employers and employees per
establishment is the same for each industry and year, the number of employees is
estimated by city, industry and year.
r : The return to the capital stock is estimated by using
rt = pIt (it + δ) ,
where it is the yield on 10-year government bonds and δ is the average depreciation
rate by industry over average Þxed tangible assets by industry. The yield data
are from the homepage of Bank of Japan. Average depreciation and average Þxed
tangible assets are taken from the Census of Manufacturing. As in Nishimura et al
(2003), changes in the price deßator for investment goods are ignored, since this index
increased so much during the bubble in Japan that the user cost of capital became
negative. Because rt is only used to estimate the average capital share over time,
this simpliÞcation is unlikely to affect our results. To check for robustness, we also
used the return to the capital stock, as in Hayashi and Prescott (2002). As this did
not change the results, we do not report them in this paper.
∆ logTFP : We estimate the average capital share of each Þrm from the sample
average of Y
rK
over time by city and industry. Then the weighted average of the
capital share is estimated by prefecture, industry and period, with the number of
establishments in 1988 and 1996 as weights. Unless otherwise stated, the same
weight is used to estimate the prefecture average. The average of the capital share
over the period is chosen to estimate φ
0(ka)ka
φ(ka)
. Value added, capital stock and the
sum of employees and employers are aggregated by industry and prefecture in 1988
and 1996. Then ∆ log TFP is estimated as deÞned.
∆ logwT : wT in 1988 and 1996 is chosen for this estimation.
∆ log ze :We estimate α, α (1− β) and αβ from the sample averages of Y
rK+wTL
, Y
wTL
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and Y
rK
over time by city and industry, respectively. Using the estimated α, α (1− β)
and αβ,
R h Y (z,s)
(wTL(s))αwT (1−α)
i
Qhzs (z, s) and
R Y (z,s)
[wTL(s)]α(1−β)K(s)αβwT (1−α)
dQhzs (z, s) are es-
timated by their sample averages over time by city, industry and period. The
weighted averages of these values are calculated by prefecture, industry and period.
The weighted average of the capital-labor expense ratio, K
wTL
, in 1988 and 1996 is also
estimated by prefecture and industry. Using these values, ∆ log ze is then estimated
by prefecture and industry.
h : To implement corollaries 11 and 12, the correlations are estimated from the sample
averages over time by city, industry and period. Then, weighted averages of the cor-
relations are estimated by prefecture, industry and period. The squared correlations
are then calculated when they are positive.
σ2u : To estimate the variance, the standard deviation is estimated by city, industry
and period. Then the weighted average of the standard deviation is estimated by
prefecture, industry and period. The square of the average standard deviation is
then estimated.
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